Tunisia: Chinese trains funded by the EBRD, a European paradox in the Mediterranean.

For Brussels, the issue is particularly sensitive because North Africa is today one of the main areas of competition between the European Union, China, the United States, the Gulf countries, Russia and Turkey.

Rome

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2 July 2026

© Agenzia Nova - Reproduction reserved

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is financing a railway project in Tunisia, but the contract for the trains has gone to a Chinese state-owned giant. The Tunisian National Railways Company (SNCFT) has awarded the China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRRC) a €38,2 million contract as part of the line doubling and electrification program.

The contract was awarded through a regular international tender, but it raises a political and industrial dilemma: how can a multilateral bank with a strong European presence like the EBRD support a strategic infrastructure in the Mediterranean while a key project contract is awarded to a Beijing-based industrial powerhouse? The project involves the doubling and electrification of the Moknine-Mahdia line, one of the priority sections considered by Tunis for modernizing public rail transport. According to SNCFT, the new trains will gradually enter service starting in the summer of 2028 and will increase transport capacity, improve the frequency of runs, and ensure higher standards of safety and comfort. For Tunisia, this is a necessary investment: the national rail network has suffered from infrastructure deficiencies, obsolete vehicles, and financial difficulties for years, while the EBRD's support allows the project to proceed under more favorable conditions than those normally available on the markets.

From a European perspective, however, the case is more sensitive. For Brussels, the issue is particularly delicate because North Africa is currently one of the main arenas of competition between the European Union, China, the United States, the Gulf countries, Russia, and Turkey. Tunisia, specifically, is a strategic partner for Brussels in the Mediterranean, but part of the project's industrial benefits go to a Chinese state-controlled group.

The issue is not the legitimacy of the contract: the EBRD, like the major multilateral development banks, applies procedures open to international competition, based on transparency and equal treatment among operators. CRRC was therefore able to participate and win the contract by submitting a competitive bid. The problem, if anything, is political. The open rules of multilateral institutions allow Chinese companies to win contracts even in projects supported by European or Western capital, while European companies continue to face significant obstacles in accessing the Chinese market and Beijing's public procurement. CRRC, one of the world's largest manufacturers of railway equipment, has production capacity, economies of scale, and public support that are difficult for European competitors to match. Its presence in Tunisia confirms Beijing's ability to penetrate development projects financed by Western institutions in African and Middle Eastern markets.

In recent years, the European Union has introduced tools to defend itself from distortions of competition and seek greater reciprocity from Beijing. The International Procurement Instrument aims to open third-country public procurement markets to European companies. The Foreign Subsidies Regulation, on the other hand, allows the European Commission to intervene when a non-EU company benefits from public aid that distorts competition in the European market. These instruments, however, primarily impact procurement within the EU. They have much more limited effects when the tender involves a partner country and is managed according to the rules of a multilateral bank. And this is where the European paradox arises. Europe seeks to strengthen its economic and industrial influence in the Mediterranean, but the open rules of multilateral financing end up favoring its main strategic competitors.